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1. From structural to cognitive semiotics
There are many ways to think of meaning and the possibility or
impossibilityî of studying it. One way was characterized by the Swiss
philosopher Elmar Holenstein, in an interview by R. Benattiêz
The central concepts of cognitive science are all semiotic
concepts (representation, symbol, information, code, program
etc.) or imply semiotic concepts (computation). When
cognitive scientists define themselves by proclaiming that they
deal with Physical Symbol Systems, it is only a historical
accident that one does not speak of semiotic science but of
cognitive science. From a phenomenological point of view, it
is a lucky accident because cognition is not exclusively
logically and symbolically structured4.
l University of Ãrhus.
2 The unanalyzability of meaning is claimed by 'meaning scepticisms' or 'language
scepticisrns' which need not spring from general scepticism but instead be rooted in
physicalistic naturalization programs, cf. K. HVIDTFELT NIELsBN,I:1ter*pren'ng
SpI`noza's Arguments--Toward a Formal Theory of Consistent Language
Scepricism: Imiraring Ethica, New York, The Edwin Mellen Press, Studies in
Linguistics and Semiotics, vol. 15, 2003.
3 R. BENATFI, “lnterview", Scripta Semiorica, vol. 1, 1992, pp. 133-150.
4 1r›fa.,p.14s.
Recherches en con*zmum'cation, n° 19 (2003).
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Semiotic concepts include traditional cognitive concepts, but
from a phenomenological point of view, human cognition should also
be approached by other semiotic concepts than those concerned with
symbolic logic and purely symbolic representations, such as the
semiotic concepts of iconicity (characteristic of imagery) and of
indexical forms (characteristic of dynamic schemas). Holenstein is
probably the first scholar to suggest the désignation Cognitive
Semiotics for a preferential project in contemporary research on
meaningl. Being himself a specialist in Edmund Husserl and Roman
Jakobson, he has trained and inspired younger British philosophers
like Kevin Mulligan, Barry Smith, and Peter Simons, who have then
based their thinking on a phenomenological realism linking cognition
and semiotics. This line of thought and research has long been
influential in Danish semiotics and was substantially consolidated
during the last decade. In this article, I wish to mention yet another
influential contribution to the shaping of 'semio-cognitive' thinking
and analysis of meaning, namely what may be considered a Latin
contribution.
In Europe and Latin America, a broad interdisciplinary school?
of structural semiotics, centered in Paris and Bologna, emerged in the
'structuralist' l960ies and stayed influential well into the l990ies,
before eventually losing its impetus in a new academic context of
deconstructionist or hermeneutic relativism and nominalism.
Structural semiotics was an interdisciplinary, research-oriented,
theoretical enterprise which advocated a view of cultural analysis and
theory as a generalized linguistic project. It addressed the humanities
in general and aimed at finding general or universal structures of
meaning behind particular cultural and social, indeed preferentially
aesthetic, manifestations of expression-bome contents _ from texts
to gesture, music, painting, architecture and so forth. The main
principle was the idea that stable patterns of meaning could be found
across occurrences of apparently unstable and context- and media-
bound 'significations'. Meaning could thus be seen as grounded in a
l Ihid.
2 The group of researchers gathering around professor A. J. Greimas is representative
of this tendency in semiotics, cf. H. PARRET & H.-G. RUPRECHT (eds), Exigences et
perspectives de la séntíotique. Recueil cl 'hommages pour Algirdas Julien Greinias, l
Aims and Prospects of Semiotics. Essays in honor of A. J. G., I - 11, Amsterdam,
Philadelphia, John Benjamins, 1985 and M. ARRIVE & J.-C. COQUET (eds),
Sémiotique en jen. A partir et autour de fœzrvre d'A. J. Greimas, Paris, Amsterdam,
Philadelphia, Hadès-Benjamins, 1987.
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structurally stable semiotic 'competence', efficient across variations
in 'performance'. Hence, in the predominant Parisian versionl, the
notions of stratification, generativity, transformations, and most
importantly, of a surface structure superimposed upon a deep structure
--all terms reflecting the vocabulary of generative grammar of the
l960ies2-- became keystones of this semiotic theory "... à vocation.
sciem'zfique" (scientifically committed). A 'deep structure' of meaning3
would be a constitutive instance at a grounding level, a structuration
of thinking proper, or of pure imagining, bound to be expressed and
manifested through a process of concretizing transpositions or
translations, sometimes called 'conversions'. A 'surface structure' of
meaning would then represent and manifest this 'deep' meaning in a
modified version, restructured and adapted to the circumstances of
present communication, i. e. contextualized, by the process of
derivation. Surface meaning would be a translated *transformed-
version of deep meaning. It would contextualize the underlying,
context«free thinking ('meaning-production') involved. The expressed
and expression-bound meaning (the surface content) was seen as a
circumstantial translation (transposition, transformation, or
conversion) into some form of verbal discourse or some non--verbal
semiotic system, of an underlying, non-discursive meaning (deep
content).
Ontologically speaking, a surface structure would be pragmatzb,
i. e. functionally determined, whereas a deep structure would be
semantic, i. e. functionally undetermined but cognitively constitutive
as elementary ideation, thinking, and thus only determined by the
universal design of the formats of 'meaning production', in other
words: of cognitive conceptualization. Here is where the cognitive
motif enters the picture.
Methodologically speaking, the surface structure of an utterance
in some semiotic system would be immediately accessible to the
consciousness of the semiotic subject whose inner 'cognizing' it
1 Cf. A.J. GREIMAS & J. COURTÉS, Séniiotique. Dictionnaire raisonné de la théorie
du langage, I, Paris, Hachette, 1979.
2 ln this European perspective, Noam Chomsky was often regarded as an American
structuralist. This view vanished rapidly when cognitive linguistics emerged in the
19805.
3 Notice that this use of the generative terminology: 'deep' and 'surface' structure,
'transformations' etc., do not technically reflect their use in generative grammar.
instead they reflect the structuralist view of stratification in meaning. I tend to see
this historical state of affairs as a case of fruitful misunderstanding.
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would translate and express, or to the consciousness of the subjects
who interpret it (including the structural analyst), whereas the deep
structure would remain hidden, less or not at all accessible to
consciousness in real time, and only accessible post fesrum, through
structural analysis. The 'surface meaning' would thus be
phenomenologically given to the utterer and the addressee, and to
everybody else around, whereas the 'deep meaning' were to be made
explicit and phenomenologically manifest by some special techniques
of structural analysisl.
The central concern of this form of thinking consisted, of course,
in analyzing and applying structural models. 'Formalizations'
including Saussurean oppositions, Greimasean squares, graphic
diagrams and sequential formulae of different kinds, were elaborated
and suggested as technical models in this sense, as analytical prompts
guiding the approach to this core object of structural semiotics: the
(deep) meaning of (surface) meamng. -- How were the results of
analysis verified, one may ask. The answers given were not always
clear, but the general epistemological style of structuralismz prevailed:
since the deep meaning of an occurrence is an event of rhz`n.kin.g and
therefore must be intelligible per se, once it is discovered and made
explicit, it can therefore in principle be experientially grasped and
compared to its surface version; and if the latter can reasonably be
understood as an avatar of the former, the analysis is considered more
valid and plausible than if not. Thus, conscious experience will
'verify', validate, the analyst's hypotheses on 'non-conscious
meanings'3. Once verified in this sense, a result gives rise to
predictions of similar results in occurrences otherwise related to the
one in question, and if those are obtained, the validity of the first
result is again strengthened.
i In communication, subjects would not even need to access the deep structures that
determine their surface structures, since meaning survives the contextualizing
transpositions. This idea might be one of the most valid 'generativist' contributions
to an actual model of the process of meaning-production.
2 Cf. C. LÉVI-STRAUSS,Anthropologie structurale, I, Il, Paris, Plon 1958, 1973.
3 What happens to an explicitated meaning that the analyst verifies, whereas the
community of its 'surface' utterers and interpreters rejects it? The structural analyst
will have to maintain its validity, and to declare its use 'unconscious' -- the reby
intending that its users have special reasons for not acknowledging it, not that it is
in principle unaccessible to their consciousness. An epistemology must face
ideology, in order to avoid relativism.
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These principles of stratification and phenomenological
verification by explicitation and comparison are elementary in
structural research on meaning. They need no justification in a
'generativistic' universalismi, but instead -I think- they deserve
attention as reasonable ontological and methodological suggestions
for a less restricted project studying meaning in an evolutionary
perspective. They are practically common to all forms of research on
meaning, including historiography. And they are strikingly analogous
to the general principles of cognitive semantics. Conceptual
metaphor2, conceptual integration3, conceptualization in general,
including so-called 'ception' (to avoid the alternative per- / con-) in the
linguistic work on closed-class meanings by L. Talmyi, and the
schematic explorations of grammar by R. Langacker5 -- these and
many other concept-oriented forms of analysis and theory Iikewise
consist in suggesting models of meaning structures that do not occur
immediately to 'cognizing' or communicating subjects, but can be
modelled and thereby be made explicit and phenomenologically
present to analysts and to 'cognizing' subjects, who will then be able
to compare them to the immediate meanings of the analyzed
occurrences, and who will then evaluate their plausibility as
cognitively given meanings underlying their immediately
experienceable translations. A cognitive structure of meaning is in
fact a deep structure in the sense of structural semioticsö. But the
status of 'depth', which is no longer generative in the historical sense,
has to be specified.
I intend to show how these principles of a 'stratified
phenomenology' can then help us elaborate an adequate theoretical
framework for the study of cogm'tz`on, culture, and conununication.
i There are even reasons to believe that linguistic syntax is the only semiotic field
where they are not relevant: one, and the most important, may be that syntax in
language is to be found exclusively at the level of semiotic surface structure.
2 Cf. G. LAKOPF, Woman, Fire, and Dangerous Tltings. What Categories Reveal
about the Mind, Chicago-London, University of Chicago Press, 1987.
3 Cf. G. FAUCONNIER & M. TURNER, The Way We Tliinlr. Conceptual Blending and
the Mind's Hidden Complexities, New York, Basic Books, 2002.
4 Cf. L. TALMY, Toward a Cognitive Sernantics, I & ll, Cambrige, Mass., M.I.T.
Press, 2000.
5 Cf. R.W. LANGACKER, Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, I &. Il, Stanford,
Stanford University Press, 1987, 1991.
6 The terminological problem involved is that cognitive semanticists apparently have
to avoid all terminological references to generative grammar, and therefore cannot
appropriately clarify their epistemological position by explicit critical work.
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2. Dynamic intermezzo
In the 1980ies, some branches of structural semiotics and semio-
linguistic semantics' were influenced by the works of the
mathematician and philosopher René Thomï, who had seen a relation
between mathematical topology, biological forms, and semiotic
(deep) structures. Thom's catastrophe topologies were interpreted as
models and applied in semiotic analysis, both in terms of 'actants'3
translating grammatical constituents and verb meanings, in terms of
logical formats transcribing Greimasean 'square' models, and as
dynamic representations of the modal-verb meanings4 formerly
studied by Greimas and -in the Califomian cognitive sernantics-- by
Talmy and Sweetser, who had explored various modal and causal
models of 'force dynamics', or of 'forces and barriers'. Since the
Thomian inspiration originated in epistemological problems of
biology, mathematics, and natural science in general, it inherited
realistic philosophical habits of thinking and contributed to an
epistemological 'naturalization' of the semiotic framework. Meaning
was already seen as 'deeper' than its manifested phenomenon; now it
was more drastically separated from language and discourse, and
conceived as grounded in the biological nature, i. e. the cognitive
neurobiology of the human mind. Here, meaning is what happens in
the naturally prestructured mind of persons when they actively or
passively perceive or conceive some entity, or when such minds
Cf. W. WILDGEN, A1clzetypensetnantilr. Grttndlagen fiir eine dynainisclze Semantil:
arg' der Basis der Katastrophentheorie, Tübingen, Gunter Narr Verlag, 1985; IDEM,
De la grammaire au discours. Une approche morphodynamique, Bern, Peter Lang,
Series European Semiotics, 1999; J. PETtTOT~COCORDA, Morphogenèse du sens.
Pour un schématisme de la structure, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1985;
IDEM, Physique du Sens. De la théorie des singularités aux structures sém.io~
narratives, Paris, Éditions du CNRS, 1992; P.Â. BRANDT, La charpente modale du
sens. Pour une sémio-linguistique morphogénétique et dynamique,
AmsterdamfPhiladelphia/Arhus, John Ben'amins & Arhus University Press, 1992;
IDEM, Dynamiques du sens, Arhus, Arhus University Press, 1994; IDEM,
Morphologies of Meaning, Arhus, Arhus University Press, 1995.
Cf. R. THOM, Stabilité structurelle et morphogenêse. Essai d'ane théorie ge'ne'rale
des modèles, Reading, Mass., W.A. Benjamin Inc. 1972; IDEM, Apologie du logos,
Paris, Hachette, 1990.
3 The term stems from the French linguist Lucien Tesnière, cf. L. TESNIÈRE.,
Éléments de syntaxe structurale, Paris, C. Klincksieck, 1965.
4 Cf. P. Ã. BRANDT, La charpente modale du sens, op. cit.
l
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communicate, in the sense that their owners express something and
'mean' what they express (which is the case if the expressed content is
after all -across all transpositions- what these persons are thinking
and intending to express, supposing that they are able to check and
report if this is the case).
Traditionally, and particularly before its structural tum, semiotics
had mainly been known as an auxiliary hermeneutic discipline mainly
concerned with sign models appropriate for surnmarizing the shifting
historical interpretations of occurring signs, preferably verbal. In this
new perspective, not only the -quite trivial- sign model (signifier
over signified [signifiant-signifié], or form-meaning pairings) and its
philosophical problemsi, all referring to communication and coding,
but also the host of new challenging issues related to understanding
consciousness, the human mindi, the psychological mechanisms of
attention and perception, categorization and memory, thinking and
affect, intersubjectivity and empathy, embodiment and abstraction,
were to be addressed, and the new debate over these issues was to
contribute to reformulating the entire field and view of semiotics,
optimistically intended as a natural science of meaning and culture.
Semiotics, conceived as the scientific study of the entire meaning
dimension in human cognition, con'm1unication, and culture, and no
longer just as some discourse on discourse, or some circle-spinning
hermeneutics of hermeneutics, consequently had to be reframed to a
considerable extent.
However, it preserved an essential feature that came to
distinguish it in the new disciplinary context: its specialization in the
study of autonomous meaning, in the sense of conscious phenomena
that are not .only linked to or referring to perception, emotion, and
behavior, or to neuro-physiological processes in the human brain, but
also to meaning itself, to other meaningful ideas, as an autoreferential
mecanism. Meaning in this sense of an autonomous ontological form
of being is maintained as a mental (individual, private, or collective,
shared) realm of events that establish mutual relations between
1 Cf. U. ECO,/-1 Theory of Semiotics, Bloomington, Indiana Universty Press, 1976.
This author has evolved substantially since that work was published, and is now
intellectually close to the views of cognitive semiotics.
2 The best account of the entire field and its issues is given in a beautiful essay by the
Canadian neuropsychologist and philosopher Merlin Donald (M. DONALD, A Mind
So Rare. The Evolution of Httman Consciousness, New York/London,
W.W. Norton & Co, 2001.
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themselves, that is, internal relations between contents in the human
mind. Such relations grow and form networks from entity to entity in
the 'inner phenomenology' of meaning as structured by metaphorical
concepts, by mental spaces, by figurative and dynamic schemas,
categories, and semantic domainsl: all over the human imaginary,
relations and connections of different kinds are developed,
established, and reinforced -maintained by symbolization both
individually and collectively, i. e. both idiosyncratically and
culturally, and their structural principles must therefore precede
idiosyncrasy as well as cultural specificity.
The intemal connections between mental contents -connections
that our minds are able to hold, elaborate, and evaluate, before letting
them determine our beliefs, behaviors, acts, or affective reactions-
must be organized according to general or perhaps universal,
integrative and schematic principles, and we will have to find and
study them. These principles are still far from being well identified,
classified, systematically studied, let alone well understood, but a
joint venture of cognitive semantics and dynamic semiotics is
currently beginning at least to make the very taslc of developing this
dimension of cognitive science explicit and to acknowledge its
relevance. The resulting general project is presently becoming known
to academia under the label2 of cognitive semiotics.
3. What is symbolization?
Cognitive semiotics thus considers meaning as such as its
essential concern, and is prepared to interrelate semiotic relations
established internally, between semantic contents by purely mental
connectors, and those established externally, between expressed signs,
1 My current account of this panoply is given in P. Ã. BRANDT, Spaces, Domains and
Meaning. Essays in Cognitive Seniiotics, Bern, Peter Lang, Series European
Semiotics, 2003 (in press).
2 A M.A. curriculum in Cognitive Semiotics has recently been established at the
Center for Semiotic Research, University of Arhus. Its general line of research is
presented in the Danish anthology Kognitiv Semiotilr (P. BUNDGAARD, J. EGHOLM
& M. SKOV, Kognitiv semiotilr. En antologi om sprog, betydning og erlrendelse,
Copenhagen, P. I-laase og Sans Forlag, 2003). The preliminary title of this volume
was "Dynamisk semiotik" [Dynamic Semiotics], since this was the label of the
actual tendency in the 1990ies, at a moment when the introduction of dynamic
modelling was its most salient feature.
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or between signs and the acts they command or the neuro-
physiological (affective) states they report onl. It claims that the study
of this 'semio~semantic' dimension of the cognitive project is crucial
not only to an appropriate understanding of grand-scale
communication and culture, but even to the most elementary micro-
study of human thinking and feeling. If culture and cultural variation
are natural phenomena, based on an individual capacity to create
concepts, communicate them, and learn them from other individuals,
then we urgently need to study the grounding phenomenon of 'shared
cognition' given in intersubjective behaviors, such as cooperative
work, exchange of services, goods, persons, information; and in pure
dialogue. In such behaviors, individuals can indeed be said to 'share'
meanings. The general explanation appears to be that intersubjectivity
of meaning is based on these individuals' capacity to sigmfy and to
identify each other's signifying mode of interrelating contents and, on
the grounds of identified interrelations, at least roughly (structurally:
schematically), to further identify their elements.
Signifying meaning is probably only possible because of the
relarional 'essence' of meaning: what needs to be shown and picked
up in thought and communication is the symbolic' proximiry of
'related' items. Symbolizationï” is inherently syntactic; to symbolize is
simply to connect within a frame and thereby create a syntax. We do
not 'symboIize'3 items one by one, but by grouping, collocating,
compounding things that do not otherwise 'belong together' and which
must therefore be taken as 'symbols', precisely for this reason. In a
sense, this principle of symbolic proximity is aesthetic: the
functionally absurd collocation of objects within aframe is exactly
whatactivates the intentional reference to meaning. .Framing and
intending are one and the same; the form called a frame induces the
substance called intention. What is absurd per se can thus easily
become meaningful par e.rcellence4. It is even difficult to stop absurd
configurations from being perceived as symbolically meaningful.
They are meaningful because experienced as 'rneant': in the eyes,
1 Brain, Meaning, and Behavior are seen as three equally important and interrelated
topics and forms of reality.
2 Note that symbolization is in no way equivalent to or limited to the practice of
symbolic logic.
3 ln the sense of: ascribing socially significant, unpredictable and non-trivial abstract
meanings to objects or forms.
4 This is, I suspect, the surrealistic origin of semiotic behavior, inherent in all forms
of humor, from archaic to modern.
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cars, or hands of an observer, such collocations must be signified as
'thought out' by someone. The syntactic proximity of symbols in
such a framed 'formula' is inherently connected to the relational
essence of meaning: connecting things is connecting people. In our
species, to connect things is, inherently, to think -not necessarily in
the strong Peircean sense of finding solutions to problems, but in the
broader and more playful sense of trying out combinations of
imaginary contents* and to think-with~someone1. These imaginary
contents arise directly from the compounded things in a way well-
known to all humans: framed things are lifted out of their singular
mode of presence and are taken as representatives of their categories
(tokens of their types), and when they are perceived as co-present in
the same frame, their constellation is cognized as a syntactic phrase
that utters something more abstract than the sum of these categories.
Framing generates generic predication.
Language proper is not a necessary prerequisite of this 'semio-
genetic' process, as it may have emerged through the evolution of our
species and probably of other hominoids. Verbal language, including
grammatical organization of meaning and an overall organization of
phonetic and gestural signifying, evidently constitutes an interesting
case of auditive symbolization, perhaps anticipated by some forms of
music; the decisive advantage of verbal language, however, is
twofold: its structural contrast between word and grammar makes it
possible for users to form radically better, still more 'absurd', non-
trivial, compositions, and thus to create intensely significant syntactic
constellations. And the high reproducibiliry of its expressions
multiply their saliency and significance, since it allows them to spread
effortlessly over large groups of (already) communicating subjects
and thus to be substantially reinforced and stabilized by an endless
cultural broadcasting and feedback, creating a drastically enhanced
semiotic coherence (and a corresponding 'ethnic'2 excitability) in a
population.
Language evolves as a semiotic medium that lends itself to an
apparently unlimited activity of translating from other modes of
thinking and symbolizing. As all other semiotic modes or systems,
language manifests an unsolvable dramatic conflict between unity,
i The authorial plural 'we' is inherent in all symbolic behaviors.
2 'Ethnicity', collective idiosyncratic behavior, is probably just semiotic fine-tuning;
it pays its price in the form of decreasing individual sensibility to people outside the
'ethnic' in-group.
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based on the presence of universal structural properties, and
differenciation, tendencies to differ in structure whenever and
wherever communicative attention is intense. The better it works, and
the more refined it makes local communication, the weaker it makes
general and global communication. Language exponentially blows up
not only the intellectual potential of cognition but also the culture-
formmg potential of symbolization.
In this discussion, one of the remaining deep evolutionary
questions is: how did we then leam to frame, and thus to symbolize?
The answer to this question is still unfound, but there are strong
reasons to believe that artistic, religious, and ritual activities are main
sources of this crucial mental operation.
4. A cognitive-semiotic model of culture
The stratified view of meaning, inherited from structural
semiotics, allows us to articulate the contextual and the non-
contextual aspects of meaning. The relational view of symbolization
further offers us an entry to the study of contextualization as a
constitutive generator of culture and cultures.
In fact, the notion of context refers either to radically
circumstantial specifications, such as the particular characteristics of
individual participants and their inteipersonal situation, or to generic
specifications of thinking and acting such as those following from a
genre of discourse or of practices in a given society of a certain type
and marked by certain ethnic styles and notions, in short: culture. Our
'deepest' cognitive operation-s, -such as causal linking, comparing
events to each other, etc., are expressed in forms conditioned by
nothing but our mind itself; but these operations are therefore
contextually specified at two levels, first at this 'shallow' level of
cultural editing, then at the 'surface' level of situational editing. The
inverse process of interpretation extracts meaning-as-«thinking from its
situationally and culturally edited form, so to speak by subtracting
these semiotic transpositions, i. e. , by de-specifying it (cf. figure 1).
32 _ PER ÁGEBRANDT __ _
situational contextualizationsm 1 1~~ e se e eu ce eve (eauingi (inierpmiing)




Deeplevel * *e se ~ * ~ fe
Figure 1: Cognitive semiotic stratification
It is a phenomenological fact that expressive communication
through this process of editing and interpretation is felt as a natural
context of cognitive activity. The 'cognizer' experiences his own
'making sense' as a production of meaning with other subjects
(minds) that virtually or actually interpret his utterances. His mental
contents are in this sense elements of meaning insofar as they stay
recognizable through the entire intersubjective arch of edition and
interpretation. The finality, we might say, of cognition is to yield
shared meaning.
The cultural contextualization involves framing. Therefore it
involves symbolic reorganization of the cognitive contents in
question: a continuous flow of thinking has to be 'cut up' or
condensed into syntactic wholes that can' be contained within a finite
frame. This process of syntactic editing and symbolic reshaping of an
underlying imaginary event (an occurring representation of some
referent) is probably related to what the cognitive research tradition
calles embodiment. The gestural acting by which we can theatrically
show to each other what we are thinking is in fact organized by a
temporal staging as of a play, a fictive doing that makes it possible for
our body to fill a role or a set of roles in some phrase accounting for
the structure of a scenario. If this hypothesis is valid, then cognitive
embodiment happens between the deep and the surface structures;
which would explain why we do not necessarily find any embodied
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aspects in deep and abstract cognitive contentsl, but always find
cultural characteristics of situational expressions bound to their
embodied manifestation, and par excellence in gesture.
It should be understood that the mental integrations that form the
overall architecture of the human 'inner life', or imagination, will take
place on the 'deep' level of the above model. The merging of sensory
material into entities of multimodal perception and of these percepts
into space-time 'worlds', that finally integrate in our affective
configurations and our beliefs, all unfold as neuro-phenomenological
processes that contexual determinations will further specify when they
stabilize as meanings and then are memorized. The active function of
memory and consciousness in our mental architecture cannot be
adequately described in the perspective of integration only, but needs
the view of cognitive semiotic stratiﬂcation to be clarified. Contents
have to be rendered reﬂexive, through edition and interpretation, at
least virtually (by intersubjective simulation, as in inner speech), and
thus to become meanings, in order to be memorized. To 'pay attention
to' some object is to let this reflexivization happen.
It may be relevant to note, as a final remark, that the relation
between objects and signs, in the ordinary sense of this term (aliquid
stat pro aliquo), will turn out to be singularily close when considered
in this framework: when objects are firstly cognized, they are
integrated contents of consciousness, but when they are secondarily
presented, virtually or actually communicated, they are seized by a
reflexive attention and retention, and, through this transformation,
have to become signs *signs of their symbolically given contexts, of
the generic 'signifieds' or denotations hereby created, and as all signs,
receptive to situational connotations.
' The doctrine of signs will have to be revised thoroughly in the
scientific context of cognitive semiotics. And the cognitive notion of
semantics will have to be modified in the light of the strong
communicative focus in this approach. However, the most important
aspect of the research to be realized is its empirical commitment. In
cognitive semiotics, language, art, human manifestations of meaning
in general, are to be analyzed as found, whether experimentally or
i I have argued elsewhere (P. À. BRANDT, "Mental spaces and cognitive semantics. A
critical comment", to appear in Journal of Pragmatics, 2004) that cognitive
semantics has long been inhibited by Spinozan notions and inappropriate anti-
Cartesianism; the issue touched upon here is particularly sensitive to positions in
this implicit philosophical debate.
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historically, rather than to be invented by the theoretician for the sake
of illustration. This explicit empirical commitment is, I would suggest
to think, the necessary prerequisite to the future development of a
coherent theory of mind and meaning.
